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Abstract
This paper puts forward a new way to manage risk in case 
of unaffordable disasters and failures. Using the example 
of space activities and High Reliability Organisation 
frameworks, we will show that the reproduction of 
validated routines may be a major way for organisations 
to exhibit high levels reliability. 
In order to face high levels of risk, large space organi-
sations have developed a rigorous knowledge codifi cation 
and tend to reproduce routines within the phase of project 
planning and in the context of fi rm relationships. Repro-
duction of validated routines is a relevant tool to mitigate 
risk and to manufacture reliable technical systems.
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INTRODUCTION
With a remarkable record of 113 successful missions 
and only 3 launch failures, Ariane 4 is the most reliable 
commercial space rocket that has ever been manufactured. 
One of these 3 launch failures results from a trivial error 
which would have no major consequences, if space 
activities were not so risky. The crash investigation 
concluded that the failure was caused by an unscheduled 
intervention on the boosters of the first stage. More 
precisely, someone forgot a piece of fabric on the feeder 
of one of the four Viking boosters of the fi rst stage.  This 
led at fi rst to an unbalanced thrust and then to the crash of 
Ariane 4 (Ritchie & Lallour, 1998).
This unfortunate failure underlines that technical fail-
ures may result from errors in the task coordination made 
by organisations. As technical systems are never exclu-
sively manufactured and operated by other technical sys-
tems, the organisations might obviously be responsible for 
technical failures. 
This type of failures is called by Vaughan (1990) the 
“organisational-technical system failures” and this paper 
explores this issue through the example of space activities. 
Several scholars such as Turner (1976), Perrow (1984), 
Roberts (1990), LaPorte and Consolini (1991) share the 
standpoint that the source of technical failures may be 
found in organisational area.
In order to analyse this issue, scholars assume that 
organisations which are operating risky technical systems 
face more frequently those “organisational-technical sys-
tem failures”. These organisations are a specific group 
called the “High Reliability Organisations”  (HROs) and 
for instance they can operate naval aircraft carriers (Weick 
& Roberts, 1993), air traffic control systems (Weick, 
1990) and nuclear power generation plants (Bourrier, 
1996). 
The risky nature of HROs activities is the reason why 
they have developed organisational solutions in order to 
exhibit high levels of reliability. HROs are broadly en-
gaged in risk management in order to prevent unafford-
able failures. The need to exhibit high levels of reliability 
is strongly related to an organisational pattern focused on 
the avoidance of failures. 
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Large space organisations like space agencies and 
manufacturers are also very engaged in risk management, 
when they manufacture and operate space rockets, 
satellites and space probes. Within space activities, 
failures are unaffordable, because space technical systems 
come into operation either far away from Earth, or 
somewhere in space or on other planets. In consequence, 
space HROs cannot fi x defective technical systems when 
those are in operation and reliability commitments are 
focussing on manufacturing activities. 
This article analyses how space HROs mitigate risk in 
order to prevent unaffordable failures. We claim that the 
impossibility to fix space technical systems when those 
are in operation induces that risk management is based 
on the reproduction of routines validated in previous 
programs.  
In order to demonstrate our argument, we will exploit 
documents made by scholars, journalists and space engi-
neers on space activities and more particularly on manu-
facturing activities. We will also exploit some parts of a 
study conducted in 2005 within a large European space 
manufacturer and one of its suppliers1.
The article is structured as follows. Sections 2, 3 and 
4 present the main features of space HROs through the 
issue of risk. Section 5 explains why the reproduction of 
routines is a relevant strategy to maintain high level of 
reliability. Sections 6 and 7 provide evidences of this ar-
gument in space HROs. Section 8 and 9 are respectively a 
discussion and a conclusion.  
1.  LARGE SPACE ORGANISATIONS ARE 
HROS
The example of the Venera  program which was 
accomplished by the Russians may be used to provide a 
fi rst clear view of the nature of the activities conducted by 
large organisations in the space industry. 
During the 1960s and the 1970s, Russians decided to 
explore the Venus planet thanks to several space probes 
which were named Venera (Brunier, 2006pp. 173-175). 
Due to its proximity with the Sun, this planet was regard-
ed as a tropical paradise before space exploration started. 
It is only after 6 unsuccessful attempts that the Russians 
found out that this assumption was completely false. 
Thanks to Venera 7, the scientifi c community realised that 
Venus is in fact a very hostile planet with an atmospheric 
pressure which is 90 times higher than on Earth, with a 
temperature higher than 490°C and with acid sulphuric 
rains which rapidly erode any type of equipment. This dis-
covery did not discourage the Russians, because they sent 
9 more space probes towards Venus in order to analyse 
more accurately the nature of this planet. The Venera 15 
was the most reliable version during this space program 
and it has been operational only 2 hours in the Venus en-
vironment. 
If we add now that the cost of a space program is today 
between 4 billion dollars and 7 millions dollars, and above 
all, the cost of a failure often reaches 600 million dollars 
(Ritchie et al., 1998, pp. 836), we may say that large space 
organisations are conducting activities at the end of the 
spectrum across risky technical systems. 
This example underlines the fact that large space or-
ganisations such as space agencies and space manufac-
tures are member of the specifi c social group of organisa-
tions called High Reliability Organisations (HROs). We 
share this standpoint with some scholars who have treated 
the topic of HROs like Perrow (1984), Vaughan (1990), 
Bigley & Roberts (2001), Roberts & Bea (2001). 
According to Vaughan (1990), large space organisa-
tions, like NASA2, are dealing with risky technical sys-
tems when operating space shuttles. Bigley and Roberts 
(2001, p. 1293) add that organisations which are operat-
ing space shuttles are HROs and Roberts and Bea (2001, 
p. 71) enlarge the argument by saying that organisations 
that manufacture and operate technical systems such as 
the Mars Climate Orbiter and the Mars Polar Lander are 
HROs. Finally, we may say that organisations that manu-
facture and operate space shuttles, space rockets, space 
probes and satellites are HROs. 
The risky nature of the activities of large space organi-
sations brings us to consider them as HROs. However, 
space HROs show one feature which induces that they 
might be seen as specifi c HROs. 
2.  MAIN FEATURES OF SPACE HROS
2.1 The Specifi city of Space HROs
According to LaPorte (1996, p. 60), the two main features 
of classic HROs are the following: on the one hand they 
are able to manage risky technical systems, and on the 
other hand they have the capacity to meet very high peak 
demand and production in periods of emergency. Space 
HROs manage risky technical systems; however they 
are less impacted by the issue of high peak demand and 
production in periods of emergency. 
This situation results from the impossibility of space 
HROs to fi x most of the breakdowns which occur in op-
eration. It is very difficult to scrutinise the nature of a 
breakdown and to fix it when the technical systems are 
unreachable, because they are far away from the Earth. 
As Roberts and Bea (2001, p. 71) have noticed for the 
losses of both, the Mars Climate Orbiter and the Mars 
Polar Lander, the glitches were simple but it had been im-
1These organisations prefer to be unamed. 
2National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
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possible to fi x the problem. Space HROs cannot interact 
directly with the damaged space probes, or satellites. They 
cannot send astronauts to fix the breakdown, because it 
would be more expensive than the entire space program. 
Aside from the case of Hubble, where the space tel-
escope was designed to be regularly serviced by astro-
nauts, large space organisations do not send astronauts to 
fi x breakdowns (Brunier, 2006, p. 127). Space HROs are 
only able to attempt minor actions like updating software 
or trying some uncertain undertakings that may reduce the 
service life of the damaged technical systems. For exam-
ple, when solar panels of a satellite do not open, engineers 
may decide to ‘shack’ the satellite by activating the pro-
pulsion systems. This choice might eventually work, how-
ever it consumes a signifi cant volume of the fuel needed 
to maintain the orbital position of the satellite during its 
service life (Ritchie & Lallour, 1998). 
As, in space activities, it is very diffi cult to fi x break-
downs during operations, the issue of high peak demand 
and production in periods of emergency is less relevant 
than in classic examples of HROs such as naval aircraft 
carriers (Weick & Roberts, 1993), nuclear power genera-
tion plants (Bourrier, 1996), air traffic control systems 
(Weick, 1990). This is why we will not handle the issue 
of emergency crisis management in space activities in this 
article. On the contrary, this paper focuses on ex-ante cri-
sis management. 
The difficulty to fix space technical systems in op-
eration underlines the relevance of the ex-ante crisis 
management issue. One of the main ambitions of space 
HROs is to mitigate the risk of failure before launching 
their products in space environment. Ex-ante risk mitiga-
tion is essential in order to prevent potential insolvable 
breakdowns in operation. In this paper, we assume this ex-
ante risk mitigation is strongly related to the nature of the 
manufacturing activities. 
2.2 Space Activities are Risky 
A general rule in insurance theory says that the extent of 
disasters is a negative function of their occurrence. This 
applies to most of the activities; however it is not the 
case for the activities conducted by HROs because these 
organisations “can commit catastrophic errors in a number 
of ways” (Roberts, 1990, p. 162). More precisely, in space 
activities the extent of disasters often reaches 600 million 
dollars and simultaneously their occurrence is 1/8 (Ritchie 
& Lallour, 1998, p. 836). 
Many scholars on HRO literature underlined that 
HROs are dealing with risky (or hazardous) technical 
systems (LaPorte, 1996; Rochlin, 1996; Demchak, 1996, 
Mannarelli, Roberts et al., 1996). We consider that among 
the HROs, it is the space HROs which are manufactur-
ing some of the riskiest technical systems. The idea of 
LaPorte that many HROs should not exist because they 
face important risks suits for space HROs because to 
manufacture a space probe which will come to operation 
in new worlds is one of the most ambitious undertakings 
of human being. 
In order to specify the nature of the risk faced by space 
HROs, we can use the general defi nition of risk provided 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Risk is defi ned on the 
one hand by an amount of losses and on the other hand by 
an assessment of uncertainty. Both of these parameters are 
signifi cant in space activities. 
In HRO literature, the amount of losses is called the 
“cost of error” and Roberts (1990, p. 174) argues that this 
cost of error reaches very high levels. In space activities, 
it is mainly linked to the cost of the damaged technical 
system. We have already noticed that it is very diffi cult to 
fi x breakdowns in operation.  In other words, the cost of 
error tends to be high, because it is close to the cost of the 
entire space program which might eventually be cancelled. 
Another reason for the cost of failure is so high is the 
small batches produced by space HROs.  In 2001, only 
51 space rockets have been launched in the world. In the 
majority of cases, each satellite or space probe is unique 
and even the most important manufacturers do not deliver 
more than around ten units per year (Brunier, 1996, p. 
163). Consequently, a single failure would be serious for 
organisation survival. Moreover, the cost of error is also 
very high, because it includes other elements like the 
cost of collateral effects of a failure. One single failure 
may compromise funding from private or public sources 
and also threaten competitive or military advantages 
(Vaughan, 1990). 
As all HROs, space HROs have to manage risk in their 
activities, because they face high levels of uncertainty. To 
send a space probe towards worlds where no one has ven-
tured before obviously induces signifi cant levels of uncer-
tainty. We may provide some statistic information in order 
to specify this point. In space activities, 7% of failures 
have an unknown explanation (Ritchie & Lallour, 1998). 
In space probes manufacturing, we count 97 failures and 
16 partial successes among the 221 space probes launched 
since the beginning of space exploration3. In other words, 
the rate of failure is very important and reaches 43,8%. 
The reliability of space rockets is higher, however their 
rate only reaches 98.5% for the most reliable, namely the 
Ariane 4 (Brunier, 2006, p. 208). These fi gures have to be 
compared with the rate of reliability of airliners which is 
99.99%.     
3The figure 221 refers to the number of space probes which have achieved their mission in 2008.
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3.  RISK MITIGATION IN SPACE THANKS 
TO A CULTURE OF RELIABILITY
The important risk faced by space HROs induce that they 
are not failure tolerant organisations contrary to mass 
production organisations. In consequence, and as already 
noticed for classic HROs, space HROs cannot afford trial 
and error strategies either (Roberts, 1990, p. 160; LaPorte 
& Consolini, 1991; Demchak, 1996, p. 97). 
In order to cope with this hostile context, HROs carry 
out adaptive behaviours that aim at increasing reliability 
(LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). More precisely, scholars 
noticed that there is a necessary culture of reliability in 
risky activities (Roberts, 1990, p. 173; Roberts, Stout & 
Halpern, 1994). Due to the diffi culty to fi x space technical 
systems in operation, space HROs developed this culture 
of reliability in their manufacturing activities. 
This culture may be noticed in a general way by the 
capacity of space firms to be pioneers in the implemen-
tation of quality standards. During the 1960s, the space 
industry invented quality control methods in order to face 
the risk surrounding space exploration (Bach, Cohendet 
and Schenk, 2002). A study conducted in France by Ravix 
(2000), indicates that 96.9% of the aerospace firms had 
already adopted quality assurance in 1994. In compari-
son, only 49.3% of the automobile fi rms and 26.8% of the 
firms belonging to industrial sector had adopted quality 
assurance in 1994.  
The culture of reliability may also be stressed by the 
importance of technical competencies and by the organi-
sational redundancy existing in manufacturing activities. 
Technical competencies usually shape authority relations 
and decision processes in HROs and then it is obvious to 
notice that 60% of the staff in European aerospace indus-
try is composed by engineers and highly qualifi ed techni-
cians (Michot, 2004).
The redundancy is observed though a noteworthy 
specifi city of the assembly phase.  In order to make sure 
that all work is well done, there will be one person who 
assemblies the system and another person who simultane-
ously writes down each work step. This organisation of 
the assembly phase tends to contribute to organisational 
redundancy, because these two persons switch after each 
task. 
4.  REPRODUCTION OF ROUTINES IS A 
STRATEGY TO MAINTAIN HIGH LEVELS 
OF RELIABILITY
We consider that another important feature of the culture 
of reliability of space HROs is the reproduction of the 
routines validated in successful programs.  
By routines, we mean the place where organisations 
store their operational knowledge. They can be regarded 
as a highly structured set of ‘habitual reactions’ linking 
organisation members to one another and to the environ-
ment. They are all regular and predictable behavioural 
patterns of organisations. In consequence, organisations 
may be expected to behave in the future according to the 
routines they have employed in the past. One other major 
feature of routines is that they can persist only if they are 
reproduced continually. This argument explains why evo-
lutionary scholars assume that organisations remember by 
doing (Nelson & Winter, 1982).
This major argument of the evolutionary theory in-
troduces an important difference between reaching and 
maintaining high levels of reliability. We use this differ-
ence to understand why reproduction is needed to ensure 
reliability.
As Hannan and Freeman (1984) noted, the organisa-
tional behaviour which is aimed at reaching high levels 
of reliability is different from the behaviour that serves to 
maintain them. In order to reach high levels of reliability, 
organisations have to switch from an unsatisfying situa-
tion with low levels of reliability to a satisfying situation, 
where the levels of reliability are high. This requires that 
organisations search for new routines or imitate the better 
routines existing within other organisations. This change 
of routines leads to the implementation of some manage-
rial tools used to increase reliability such as quality as-
surance, knowledge codification, phase project planning 
design review and PERT methods. 
Reaching high levels of reliability is the fi rst step of ex-
ante risk mitigation; the second step is to maintain these 
high levels as long as possible. This second step requires 
a completely different strategy from the organisations. 
Instead of changing existing routines, organisations have 
to maintain all routines which have led to the increased 
reliability. As noticed by Hannan and Freeman (1984, p. 
154) “reliable performance requires that an organisation 
continually reproduces its structure”. 
When organisations do not conduct risky activities, 
like in mass production industries, the reproduction of 
validated routines might be a secondary target because 
a failure induced by a variation of the routines does not 
induce a disaster. Space HROs obviously face a different 
situation because a bad reproduction of validated routines 
has major consequences. In this case managers are con-
cerned themselves with trying to prevent variation and the 
routines progressively take on the quality of norms.  
Of course, it is not the organisations’ objective to re-
produce strictly the validated routines. Exploitation and 
refinement of those existing routines are of first impor-
tance. However, our standpoint is the following: the more 
organisations face an important risk, the stricter will be 
the aim to reproduce validated routines.
All these arguments show that the issue of reproduc-
tion of validated routines is very relevant for ex-ante risk 
mitigation in HROs. In consequence, it is obvious that 
studies on HROs often stress the need to prevent changes. 
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For instance, LaPorte (1994, p. 61) underlines that any 
change is more likely to degrade than to improve the reli-
ability exhibited by HROs. Roberts (1990, p. 169) and 
Bourrier (1996, p. 109) also share this point of view, when 
they respectively notice that the captain of the Theodore 
Roosevelt aircraft carrier insisted on never breaking a 
rule, unless carrying out this rule would mean a threat for 
safety; and that nuclear power plant management believes 
that last minutes ideas, even good ones, can endanger the 
whole planning exercise. A study of Bigley and Roberts 
(2001) on a fi re department puts forward a similar idea by 
observing the importance for organisations to maintain the 
mental models in order to be more effi cient in emergency 
situations. 
5.  REPRODUCTION OF ROUTINES AND 
KNOWLEDGE CODIFICATION IN SPACE 
MANUFACTURING
In case of unaffordable failure, a major objective of ex-
ante risk mitigation is to maintain the high levels of 
reliability which have been previously achieved by the 
organisation. The most obvious way to maintain them is 
to reproduce the validated routines that have led to reach 
these very high levels of reliability. Indeed, “a skill that 
is only exercised briefly every year or two cannot be 
expressed with the smoothness and the reliability of one 
consistently exercised fi ve days a week. […] Coordination 
is preserved, and organisational memory refreshed, by 
exercise- just as, and partly because, individuals skills are 
maintained by being exercised” (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 
107). 
As already noticed, the investigation on the one of the 
3 launch failures of Ariane 4 had shown that the crash 
was caused by an unscheduled intervention on the Viking 
boosters of the fi rst stage (Ritchie & Lallour, 1998). This 
example of failure underlines the fact that even a minor 
variation within manufacturing processes may be cata-
strophic. In consequence, space HROs, like classic HROs, 
adopt very detailed procedures in order to prevent the risk 
associated with any unordinary intervention (Bourrier, 
1996, p. 108). 
More precisely and according to the statement of Bach 
et al. (2002, p. 16), space manufacturing is based on a 
rigorous knowledge codifi cation with the aim to convert 
the relevant tacit knowledge required to ensure high levels 
of reliability in explicit knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995)
Our study realised in a major European satellite manu-
facturer confi rms this point. The space engineers in charge 
of assembly and test phases try to maintain the same man-
ufacturing processes for all type of satellites produced; 
namely for military satellites, scientifi c research satellites, 
and telecommunication satellites. By using very similar 
manufacturing processes, space engineers hope to prevent 
dangerous variations and potential failures. 
In the same way, we previously noticed that during 
the assembly phase, in order to make sure that all work is 
well done, there is one person who assemblies the system 
and another person who simultaneously writes down each 
work step. This type of organisation is used to assemble 
standard technical systems. When critical technical sys-
tems for the mission are assembled there are more persons 
involved in order to control more accurately if the work 
is done according the validated manufacturing processes. 
For instance, the assembly phase is particularly rigorous 
for telecommunication satellites because they will be used 
in commercial activities like TV broadcasting. In this 
case, manufacturer has to provide clear evidence that he 
respected the validated manufacturing processes in order 
not to be found guilty of possible failure. The documents 
written during assembly phase are called Acceptance Data 
Package and they are very important to ensure a rigorous 
compliance between validated manufacturing processes 
and performed manufacturing processes. 
The second main document used in satellite manufac-
turing is the specifi cations fi le. This document is written 
at the beginning of satellite project (namely during the de-
sign phases), and it precisely describes the nature of each 
technical system of the satellite and the way to assembly 
them. The specifications file of a new project has to ex-
hibit a compliance with specifications files of previous 
projects. 
As noticed d’Armagnac (2004, p. 224), space manufac-
turing is largely based on detailed documents that describe 
the nature and the schedule of tasks. These documents are 
a burden for organisations, yet, as they are based on simi-
lar documents validated in previous programs, they help 
space HROs to maintain high levels reliability in their 
products.
D’Armagnac (2004) also noticed that large space 
organisations show highly formalized manufacturing 
processes and this feature is very specific for space 
industry unlike as for other industries. Our study 
conducted in a firm which is working both for space 
manufactures and shipbuilders underline this point. 
The team manager explains that, when working for 
space customers, tasks which are linked to knowledge 
management, e.g. the precise recording of each working 
step may represent 50% of the entire working time - while 
it only represents 20% of the working time when the team 
is working for shipbuilders. 
6.   ORGANISATIONAL INERTIA:  A 
PROXY OF ROUTINES’ REPRODUCTION
The tendency of space HROs to reproduce validated 
routines in order to maintain their high levels of 
reliability may also be underlined through situations 
of  organisat ional  iner t ia  exis t ing wi thin  space 
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manufacturing (Dos Santos Paulino, 2006). We assume 
that organisational inertia may be a proxy of reproduction 
using Assumption 3 of Hannan and Freeman (1984, p. 
154): “High levels of reproducibility of structure generate 
strong inertial pressures”. In other words, we may say that 
there is a link between the organisational inertia exhibited 
by space HROs and their tendency to avoid changing 
routines which have been validated in successful previous 
programs. 
6.1 Organisational Inertia in Space Organisations
During the 1960s and 1970s, in a context of space 
competition between USSR and USA, NASA searched 
for new ways to provide safety technical systems to 
its astronauts. At that time, space HROs were pioneers 
concerning several manufacturing solutions implemented 
to ensure high levels of reliability. Within their internal 
and external manufacturing processes, large space 
organisations were among the first to use quality 
assurance, Phase Project Planning (PPP), design review, 
PERT methods4 and sophisticated firm relationships 
in big consortiums (Bach, Cohendet & Schenk, 2002). 
These new manufacturing solutions strongly helped large 
space organisations to increase on the one hand the level 
of reliability of their technical systems, and on the other 
hand to become HROs. 
Due to the success of these manufacturing solutions 
on reliability, organisations from mass production indus-
tries decided to adopt them. This adoption is known as the 
mechanism of spillover (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1989). 
When mass production organisations adopted those 
manufacturing solutions they also adapt them to their 
manufacturing constrains. This adaptation led to several 
improvements in PPP and in firm relationships. Yet, we 
observe that space HROs preferred to maintain unchanged 
their PPP and fi rm relationships instead of imitating mass 
production organisations. 
6.2 Reproduction in Project Phase Planning
In space activities, Phase Project Planing (PPP) was 
initially designed to allow organisations to conduct 
huge projects like Apollo program. More precisely, PPP 
was based on the idea that large space organisations are 
designed to cope with each aspects of the project. In other 
words, it is diffi cult to separate the organisation from its 
project. PPP was initially based on sequential phases, 
where the main phases are: mission analysis, feasibility 
study, preliminary design, detailed design, production, 
assembly and test. 
Organisations of the mass production industry decided 
to overlap their specifi c phases of manufacturing such as 
market analysis, design, production and marketing in or-
der to reduce time to market. Today most of the mass pro-
duction organisations have given up PPP which is based 
on sequential phases and have instead adopted a concur-
rent management where many phases are simultaneous. 
This change has helped to provide more frequently new 
products to consumers and then to increase profi ts of mass 
production fi rms. 
By contrast, the PPP of space HROs is rarely based 
on simultaneous phases  (Alcouffe, 2001). There was for 
example no real overlapping in the Spot program where 
the aim was to provide high-resolution images by launch-
ing 5 earth observation satellites between 1986 and 2002. 
We could only notice a minor overlapping between the 
preliminary design phase and the detailed design phase, 
where space HROs began with the procurement before 
having fi nished the validation of the general technical so-
lutions (Potteck, 1999). The other phases stay sequential 
which induces a real difficulty to reduce time to market 
in an industry where organisations need several years to 
manufacture one single satellite. 
We consider that space HROs willingly reproduce a 
PPP which is close to the PPP invented at beginning of 
space exploration, because it is a relevant choice to face 
high levels of risk and to prevent unaffordable failures. 
Space HROs avoid deep changes in PPP and prefer refi ne-
ments. 
6.3 Reproduction in Firm Relationships
We not ice  a  s imilar  s i tuat ion,  concerning f i rm 
relationships. 
In order to conduct huge projects in space exploration, 
e.g. the Apollo program, large space organisations have 
invented sophisticated fi rm relationships, where fi rms are 
rather standing in a partner relationship, than in a cus-
tomer supplier relationship. This new way to regard large 
firm relationships was been implemented during 1960s 
and 1970s, and it was very useful to increase reliability in 
space activities. Indeed, these fi rms relationships permits 
to conduct huge projects where no one can have all of the 
required competencies, and to share the cost of failure and 
the cost of R&D with partners. 
The success of large fi rm relationships has stimulated 
mass production organisations to adopt the same type of 
fi rm relationships. This adoption led to a generalization of 
the partnership towards small organisations like SMEs5.
Today large space firms could take advantage by ex-
tending their partnership relations with SMEs in order to 
acquire more competencies, to share cost of failure with 
more partners and to share cost of R&D in commercial 
markets like in telecommunication market. However, we 
notice that large space fi rms do not exhibit sophisticated 
relationships with SMEs like co-design relationships 
(Haas, Larre & Ourtau, 2001). As SMEs participate in 
4PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique): This method helps to achieve accurate task scheduling. 
5SME : Small and Medium-sized Enterprise
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space manufacturing only at the end of the design phase 
(Potteck, 1999), we may assume that large space organisa-
tions regard SMEs as suppliers rather than partners. 
This situation is very interesting if it is linked to our 
study made in the firm mentioned previously. This firm 
is a SME and is working for space manufactures and for 
nuclear plant manufacturers. The design manager said that 
his team does not conduct co-design activities with space 
manufactures, but it does with nuclear plant manufactures. 
If we assume that this SME is not lacking of competen-
cies, we may ask ourselves why large space manufactures 
do not take advantage of the competencies of this SME, 
and why they refuse to share the cost of failure and the 
cost of R&D. An answerer may be found in the following 
space failure. By the end of the 90s, a French space HRO 
lost a satellite because a supplier had slightly changed his 
production processes without validation (Potteck, 1999). 
7.  Discussion
7.1 Reproduction is an Essential Feature of Risk 
Management
Space HROs are facing signifi cant levels of risk, because 
they are operating expensive technical systems in new 
worlds exhibiting high levels of uncertainty. Space 
HROs have to manage risk in order to avoid disasters; 
however this management cannot be conducted during 
the exploitation phase of space technical systems because 
it is impossible to fi x them when those are in operation. 
In general, space HROs cannot significantly interact 
with space probes, satellites and space rockets because 
they cannot touch them. This feature explains why risk 
mitigation focuses on manufacturing activities and why 
we assumed that space HROs apply an ex-ante risk 
mitigation where reliability is a major concern. 
At the beginning of space exploration, space HROs 
engaged human and financial resources in order to in-
crease their levels of reliability, whereas now they engage 
resources rather to maintain the high levels of reliability 
they have reached. A simple and obvious way to maintain 
these high levels of reliability is to reproduce the routines 
which have been validated in successful programs.  As we 
have already noticed, space HROs cannot afford trial and 
error experimentation and therefore they tend to exploit 
and refi ne routines validated in previous programs. 
Thanks to a rigorous employment of knowledge codi-
fication, space HROs are able to reproduce validated 
routines in manufacturing activities. In consequence, 
space manufacturing sometimes exhibits an organisational 
inertia, because space HROs prefer to maintain validated 
routines during PPP and in firm relationships instead of 
exploring new ways in manufacturing activities. 
As it signifi cantly helps space HROs to maintain their 
technical systems highly reliable, this strategy of routines’ 
reproduction is a major feature of ex-ante risk mitigation 
and more generally of risk management when failures are 
unaffordable. 
7.2 The Two-Edged Sword of Reproduction
The major drawback of the strategy of reproduction is 
summarised by the fact that reproduction can be regard as 
a two-edged sword (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
HROs try to maintain the high levels of reliability by 
reproducing the validated routines, however this strategy 
also may prevent relevant changes. Reproduction of rou-
tines may sometimes lead to a kind of rigidity in organisa-
tions, because change becomes more and more diffi cult. 
Bach et al (2002, p. 16) underline, that knowledge 
codification inhibits creativity within organisations. 
Knowledge codifi cation favours reproduction of validated 
routines and permits to avoid negative changes. Unfortu-
nately, knowledge codification might not allow positive 
changes either and so it might deprive fi rms of solutions 
which might help to prevent disasters. 
Within risky activities, one of the main issue of knowl-
edge codification is the conversion of the relevant tacit 
knowledge into an explicit knowledge in order to ensure 
high levels of reliability. However, due to the unclear 
nature of the tacit knowledge, HROs may make mistakes 
when they identify the relevant knowledge needed to en-
sure high levels of reliability. 
The characteristics of the “Challenger disaster” have 
something to do with this type of mistake. According to 
Vaughan (1990, p. 249), both, the organisation that oper-
ated challenger (NASA) as well as the organisation that 
manufactured the defective component (Morton Thiokol) 
“were concerned with conserving resources and maintain-
ing established routines”. NASA and Morton Thiokol 
made an agreement in order to “avoid litigation and keep 
priority on returning the shuttle to flight, and bypasses 
the question of the company’s liability for the accident”. 
It seems that these two HROs did not identify correctly 
the routines needed to ensure high levels of reliability and 
they reproduced dangerous routines for safety of astro-
nauts. 
However, it would be simplistic to say that all the 
reproduced routines threaten reliability of technical sys-
tems. As the routines are the memory of organisation, it is 
impossible to assume that all routines implemented by or-
ganisation are dangerous without saying that the memory 
of organisation is dangerous. We consider that the failures 
does not result from the reproduction of routines in gen-
eral, they rather result from the reproduction of routines 
not correctly selected. 
7.3 Reproduction Remains Imperfect
When organisations identified the relevant knowledge, 
namely selected the routines needed to ensure high levels 
of reliability, they have to perform reproduction. Using 
the arguments of Nelson and Winter (1982) on the issue 
of replication, we stress that the reproduction is not cost 
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free and will always remain imperfect due to the tacit 
knowledge embedded in routines.
Although organisations remember by doing, reproduc-
tion of selected routines cannot be regarded as an automat-
ic and natural phenomenon. Routines are the place where 
the organisational knowledge is stored and organisations 
use two types of knowledge to conduct their activities, 
e.g. explicit and tacit knowledge. In order to reproduce 
the routines selected, space HROs have to reproduce these 
two types of knowledge. 
As the explicit knowledge is already codified, its re-
production is mainly an issue of resources engaged by 
organisations in reproduction. The more space HROs allo-
cate human and fi nancial resources in knowledge manage-
ment the more it will be accurately reproduced. 
The reproduction of the tacit knowledge is more diffi -
cult because is never fully identifi ed even if the organisa-
tion regularly uses it. Nobody can ensure that all the tacit 
knowledge needed will be reproduced and then nobody 
can ensure that the selected routines will be accurately 
reproduced. Due to the risky nature of space activities, or-
ganisations cannot afford an approximate reproduction of 
routines. In order to face this constrain, space HROs need 
to change tacit knowledge in explicit knowledge because 
it is easer to reproduce. 
This change is achieved through a knowledge codifi ca-
tion which is not cost free but above all which will always 
remain imperfect. Indeed, one feature of the tacit knowl-
edge is that some parts of it may remain vague and then it 
is impossible to change it totally in explicit knowledge. In 
order words, space HROs cannot ensure that some danger-
ous variations for reliability will not be introduced during 
the reproduction of selected routines. 
CONCLUSION
Using on the one hand the difference between reaching 
and maintaining high levels of reliability, and on the other 
hand the impossibility to fi x space technical systems when 
they are in operation, we stressed that space HROs base 
their risk management on an ex-ante risk mitigation which 
aims at ensuring high levels of reliability in manufacturing 
activities. Within this study, we have underlined that 
reproduction of validated routines is a major strategy of 
risk management in case of unaffordable failures. 
The importance of reproduction has become clear by 
the strong use of knowledge codifi cation in space manu-
facturing, and through the tendency of space HROs to 
maintain the existing routines during the project phase 
planning and within their fi rm relationships, although they 
could reduce time to market and R&D costs.
The strategy of reproduction might be view as a major 
tool of risk management, however the reproduction some-
times inhibits relevant changes and to reproduce routines 
can lead to failures. The second major drawback of the re-
production is that it always remains imperfect mainly due 
to the tacit knowledge embedded in routines.  
We noticed that these two drawbacks of the reproduc-
tion’s strategy are linked through the concept of tacit 
knowledge. In a future research, it would be interesting to 
exploit this link in order to analyse more precisely the na-
ture of this strategy. With a focus on the tacit knowledge, 
we think we could signifi cantly improve the understand-
ing of routines’ reproduction and then to provide a suit-
able framework for risk management in HROs. Indeed, 
we think we should not use a risk management developed 
for mass production organisations when we deal with or-
ganisations which cannot afford failures.  
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